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A RESPONSE TO FISH AND WHITE

Richard Weisberg*
[T]he relation between the speaker and what is spoken points
to a dynamic process that does not have a firm basis in either
member of the relation. (H. G. Gadamer, Philosophical

Hermeneutics).
I serve a duel function as respondent to these fine papers: first,
to find some common ground between them, then to connect them
with the announced topic involving the relationship of legal hermeneutics to the southern-based New Critical School. I have
posite~ this duel responsibility out of an allegiance to _my role
as a kind of broker between the audience's expectations and the
speaker's remarks.
It is the role as· mediator between two separate entities which
Heidegger and student Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasize in their
discussions of legal and literary hermeneutics. 1 Both Heidegger
and Gadamer posit the equal integrity of the text and its reader.
The act of interpretation mediates between these two entities; the
reader cannot (and should not) remain ignorant of his own biological and biographical "thrown-ness".2 (this avoids positivism);
nor, however, should he or she disregard certain demands which
the test makes from all readers (arguably in any generation and
from whatever background). 3
It may be the text's demands which Owen Piss has, over the
*Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University and President, Law and Humanities Institute.
1. See ge11eral/y HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, § 32, U11ders1a11dil1g a11d /11lerpretation (/962); GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 36-37, 225-40, 274-305; GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 44-58 {1976).
2. The German word is "Geworfenheit." Together wilh the concept of "Vorhabe" (fore-having), lhrownness imagizes the inevitable meeling of text and reader along the spiral of the reader's idiosyncratic biographical movement. It is unclear, however, whether Heidegger views the text (or even) in the same dynamic terms;
he does speak in lerms of the "Dasein'' (manner-of-being) of the text. Although this "Dasein" can be uncovered
only through a meeting, along the line of a reader's ever-changing thrown-ness, with the text, allowance seems
to be made for the intrinsic, objective qualitfos of the text itself. See HEIDEGGER, supra note I, at 191-92;
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOO 232,
3. Hence, Heidegger: "[T]he way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be drawn
from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner
of Being," HEIDEGGER, s11pra note I, at I91. And Gadamer:
All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by
imperceptible habits of thought and direct its gaze "on the things themselves" (which, in the case of
the literary critic, are meaningful teKtS, which themselves are concerned with objects). It is clear that
to let the object take over this way is not a matter for the interpreter of a single decision, but is "the
first, last and constant task." For it is necessary to keep one's gaze fiKed on the thing throughout all
the distractions that the interpreter will constantly experience in the process and which originate in
himself.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 236,
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past year or so, asked Stanley Fish and others to keep in mind,
particularly those of his favorite text, the U.S. Constitution. 4 To
ignore its inherent qualities - and here Piss goes a step further
than Heidegger, for "qualities" (or properties) are not "demands"
- is, for Piss, to risk idiosyncracy and even nihilism in constitutional interpretation.
Fish has responded neither as a "nihilist,"5 nor a Heideggerian,6 and certainly not as a positivist. He denies a text any particular inherent "substance" which could be "drained" (Fiss' word)
by a misinterpretation, but neither does he believe that any interpreter can do what he wishes with the text. "Not to worry," he
says to people like Piss: a "largely tacit" understanding "of the
enterprise's general purpose" will keep the interpreter from excessive subjectivity. "The judge who has learned to read in a way
that avoids cris~s" (as all Judges, he claims, have) cannot move
beyond. certain discursive norms called for by his craft, any more
than a trained basketball player (unless, I suppose, he is on the
Harlem Globetrotters) would try to kick the ball into the basket
or climb on the referee's shoulders to block an_ opponent's shot.
Fish thus to some extent gets to the place Fiss urged him to
attain, and it turns out even his methods are the same. Piss, like
many traditional legal interpreters, needs to find certain "disciplining" rules which somehow are not subject to interpretation in order
to constrain the interpreter from nihilism. Fish convincingly points
out the fallacy of those "rules": they, too, are of course open to
interpretation, politics and change both in law and literary criticism. Yet what else is Fish's own "largely tacit enterprise understanding" or "know how" - let's call it "professionalism" or Fish's
"the agent is always and already situated" (the factor that guaran4, Fiss, Objectivity a,,d Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. Rev. 739 (l982).
S. Id. at 746 n.17.
6. Bui Fish often resounds in the Heideggerian tradition. Compare:
Finally, however, you are left only with yourself and with the impossible enterprise of understanding
understanding; impossible because it is endless, endless because to have reached an end is to have
performed an operation that once again extends it beyond your reach. In short, this way lacks the satisfaction of a closed system of demonstration and is unable ever lo prove anything, although, paradoxically, this makes rigor and precision more, not less, necessary; but these very deficiencies are the
reverse side of its greatest virtue (in both the modem and Renaissance sense); the recognition that
meaning is human.
FISH, ls THERE A TEXT IN THIS Cuss? 96 (1980).
But understanding achieves its full potentiality only when the fore-meanings that it uses are not arbitrary. Thus ii is quite right for the interpre1er not to approach the text direc1ly, relying solely on
the fore-meaning once available to him, but rather to examine explicitly the legitimacy, i.e., the
origin and validity, of the foremeanings present within him.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 23 7. Ulima1ely, ii may be hazarded thal what sets Fish (to date) apart from
Heidegger and Gadamer is his reluctance to leap from the reader's self-investigation (to which all parties al·
tend) to the separate entity of the text itself (which Fish denies). This leap entails, for the Heideggerian, a
"loss of selr' (PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 51), and it is understandable perhaps that an American critical
work, produced during the I 970's, would prefer not to risk it.
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tees the orderliness of all acts of interpretation) - that an a priori assumption? How else than by some overriding assumption
can we say "a judge always knows in general what to do" 7 unless
we can posit some Fissian "virtue" in that judge which rides over
or precedes the act of interpretation? And if we posit such a priori,
have we not entered into the slippery slope leading towards textual
positivi~m?
The irony deepens when we reiterate Fish's conclusion "that
readers and texts are never in the state of independence that would
require them to be 'disciplined' by some external rule." He
elaborates by stating that "professional training" absolutely preconditions judges to "avoid interpretive crises" just as it preconditions literary critics to create such crises .
. This brings us to White. For while he might agree with Fish
that education (meaning hierarchy and praxis as well as law school
or graduate school) largely eliminates the radical fringes of interpretive discourse, he sees the ends of legal education as precisely opposed to Fish's vision of the complexity-averse judge.
White sees the creation of complexity as the aim of judicial activity and thus specifically compares it to poetry and (at least implicitly) to literary criticism. 8 White would, it seems to me,
challenge the notion that Fish takes as axiomatic. Ordinarily this
would be pleasing to Fish, for it proves the point he was trying
to make to Fiss (i.e. that one man's "disciplining rule" is another's
basketball - or at least football); but White's theory tends to negate
Fish's comforting sense that no one in the "enterprise" of adjudication would ever really reduce the Constitution to his own purely subjective vision. If the aim of legal education is to create a
poetic (i.e. a complexity-prone) judge, why should such an imaginative adjudicator be bound by any interpretive restraint?
Does this make White the nihilist in our midst? By elegantly
harmonizing the ends, as well as the means, of law and literature, is he suggesting that complexity and uncertainty in interpretation are all we can be sure of? I think not. Having pleasurably
followed White's poetics over the past decade, I know him to believe, with Fiss and Fish, in certain truths about legal culture.
All agree, as I have said, that education and praxis usually bring
a lawyer or judge into a general discursive mode which, almost
always, controls interpretation and subsequent utterance. All be7. Owen Fiss also questions this phrase in his Conventionalism, 58 S. CALL. REV. 177, 197 (1985).
8. See WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xxiv (1973) where he enrly makes "the claim implicit here that
the activities of the literary critic, his distinctions and concerns, may have significance for the professional
lives of practical people." See also Weisberg, Book Review, 74 Cot. L. REY, 327, 332-37 (1974) (reviewing
TiJE LEGAL IMAGINATION).
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lieve that context, in other words, largely controls meanings. But
White seems to feel that the context of the judicial enterprise is
a kind of poetry, not dispute resolution, a rendering complex, not
a making clear. White defines judicial "excellence not in terms
of votes or 'results' but in terms of the 'composition."' He sees
the judicial opinion at its best as a "heteroglossia," as "writing
two ways at once." Complexity-creation is, for White, the essence
of judicial culture.
Far from embodying nihilist or deconstructionist tendencies,
White's way of making the claim that each judicial opinion is a
poem, a complex linguistic reconstruction of the then available
culture, has placed him well within the New Critical tradition.
As James B. Meriwether observed of Faulkner criticisms (to take
a contextually mandated example): "The new critical tools of close
reading by the sensitive, sophisticated well-read critic [yield] most
satisfactory results when applied to Faulkner's carefully wrought
complexities." 9 White wants the same mesh in law, of subtle reading and complex texts or situations. But I notice in today's paper,
too, a salutary progression in White beyond an already provocative stance. Here, for the first time, he calls for more than close
readings of individual texts:
What is needed here is ... a responsible way of paying attention to what is before us:
to the social and cultural context of the text, in as much fullness and detail as we can manage;
to the "unsaid" that can render a simple statement complex, or a superficially complex
one foolish; to the nature, in short, of the relation between text and world. 10

White here moves beyond New Criticism into a stance perhaps
best understood in the context of our recent "law and literature"
movement. 11 Hermeticism, we argue, is apropriate to neither of
our great narrative disciplines. Both must strive to integrate into
their professional discourse an awareness grounded in linguistic
sophistication but ready to move beyond, at least occasionally,
into a trained and mature intuition about the surrounding culture. u
(That White here recognizes the primary risk of mere complexitycreation - that "the voice ... in every sense simple" may be over-

9. See J. MERIWETHER, THE LITERARY CAREER OF WILLIAM FAULKNER: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY (1971).
10. White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 5 Miss. C.L. REv. 25 (1984).
I l. See, e.g., Page & Weisberg, Foreword: The Law and Sowhem litera111re, 4 Miss. C. L. REv. 165 (1983);
Weisberg and Szulkin, Editor's Preface: Symposium on Terror in the Modern Age: I1re Vision of literatitre,
5 HU~f. RTS. Q. 109 (1983); 1 LAW AND HUM. INST, MEDIATOR I (1981) (for representative perspectives
on "Law and Literature").
12. See, e.g., S. F1sH, supra note 6, for a wonderful passage about Roman Jakobson insisting against "the
reduction of language to a formal system unattached to human purposes and values."
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looked and the narrative system thus impoverished and distorted 13
- perhaps indicates best the moral potential behind this theoretical advance.)
The idea that the legal, like the poetic, text is intertwined with
the larger culture and its crises may seem risky from a purely
New Critical perspective. Recalling Heidegger, we may be consoled. The most careful readings are those which test the reader's
"thrown-ness," his personal and cultural awareness, against another
entity, which is the text. The Heideggerian tradition counsels, 14
as a professional methodology, the lifelong inquiry into the interpreter's subjective place in the real world of power, prejudice
and passion .
. F0:r Stanley Fish, too, "sentences never appear in any but an
already contextualized form." Fish, by rejecting Piss' dichotomy
of judicial power and judicial virtue, emphasizes "the priorities,
agreed upon needs, long and short term goals, etc. of an ongoing
political project." Although Fish speaks in terms of politics and
White prefers the term "cultural context," the significant point is
that both here agree: external factors inevitably color professional pursuits. We would be disingenuous to deny the culturally-linked
aspects of our literary or legal lives and better advised to emphasize them.
The remaining conflict between White and Fish is, however,
more portentous than that between Fish and Piss, for it tests not
so much the methods of adjudication (which are presumed by both
to be professionally bounded speech acts) as its aims. For White,
the judge is a poet, one who seeks less to reach individual decisions as to contribute to the open-ended discursive community
of his culture. For Fish (at least today), the judge is a dispute
resolver, one who by inclination seeks closure and clarity. And
once we recognize that White may be right and Fish wrong as
to the ends of the judicial enterprise, all bets are off as to the
predictability of judicial behavior. Instead, we may find ourselves
in a theoretical dilemma, requiring for the perceived treat of
idiosyncratic linguistic expression15 or creative misreadings of the
13. For literary texts embodying this pervasive narrative theme about law, see H. MELVILLE, BILLY Buoo,
(1924); A. CAMUS, Tf!E STRANGER (1942); R. WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). For the view that complex legal systems self-interestedly move toward narrative formalism and away from the more direct modes
of simpler values and speech patterns, see WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WoRo: THE PROTAGONIST AS
LAWYER IN MODERN FtCTION (1984).
14. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 3 and 6. See also HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 2 at 192: "If, when
one is endangered in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, one likes to appeal (beruft] to what 'stands
there,' then one finds that what 'stands there,' in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed
assumption [ vormeinung] of the person who does the interpreting."
15. The domain itself of the poet.

SAILOR

62

MISSISSIPPI COUEGE LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 5:57

legal text1 6 a set of immutable Fissian disciplinary rules
("Fissiplins"?) or - much better - a richer and more value-laden
education into the scope of literary lawyering. 17

16. One of the domains of the interpreter, be he critic, poet or judge. See H.

BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF

INFUJENCE (! 973).

17. See Smith, 71ie Coming Renaissatice ilr Law and Li1era111re, 7 U. Mn. L. F. 84 (1977).

